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MINORITY CHALLENGE OF MAJORITY
ACTIONS IN A CLOSE CORPORATION IN
ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES
HYPOTHETICAL CASE
A, B and C each own respectively ioo shares of the stock of X
corporation. These are all of the outstanding shares, of the par
value $ioo per share. The corporation was organized and began
business five years ago. It started with a capital of $30,000,
contributed by the 300 shares. X corporation has earned (after
taxes): ist year, $10,000; 2d year, $15,000i 3rd year, $25,000;
4th year, $40,000; 5th year, $50,000-a total of $140,000. C
has repeatedly requested that dividends be paid, but A and B,
who control the corporation, have refused. (A and B have large
personal incomes and if the corporation paid large dividends,
A and B would be subject to a heavy income tax on these divi-
dends). Instead, A and B propose to expand the plant and
equipment by an additional capital of $120,000; they propose to
raise the capital by a new issue of i2oo shares at par, with a right
to each shareholder to buy 4o0 shares (.e., 4 new shares for each
share now held). C claims: that there is no real need for the
expansion; that the object of the offering of the new shares is
simply to dilute his interest because he is financially unable to
take his proportion of the shares, as A and B well know, and that
outside parties will neither buy a minority block of shares in a
close corporation like this one nor will they loan him money on
the security of such a block of shares; that the present shares
are worth between $55o-6oo each on the basis of book values and
even more on the basis of earning power. He claims that the
corporation, which has $40,000 cash in hand, none of which is
necessary for working capital under the current operation of the
company and its current receipts, should pay a dividend of at
least $30,oo0 ($ioo per share) and that in any event the pro-
posed issuance of new shares should be enjoined (i.e., forbidden
by court order). What are Cs prospects for compelling the
payment of dividends or for enjoining the issuance of the new
shares at $ioo per share?
MINORITY CHALLENGE
MINORITY RIGHTS UNDER ITALIAN LAW*
The hypothetical case presents the following question: Whether a
minority stockholder in a corporation has the power. to prevent two
decisions taken by the stockholders' assembly, the one refusing to
distribute accumulated and available profits and the other authorizing
an increase of capital by the issuance of shares upon giving pre-emptive
rights to stockholders. It should be added that in the facts under con-
sideration two important circumstances appear. One is that the minority
stockholder does not have the financial means to acquire the shares pre-
emptively offered him. In consequence, these shares, being shares in a
dose corporation and hence not readily disposable on the market, would
be acquired by the majority stockholders at par, although actually their
value is much greater. The second circumstance is that in the event of
distribution of profits by way of dividends, a very substantial income tax
would be imposed upon the recipients, particularly on the majority
stockholders.
It should be noted at the outset that under Italian Law the corporate
organ that has the power of decision in the distribution of dividends in
a stock corporation is the stockholders meeting in "ordinary assembly,"
when it approves the balance sheet," while to increase the capital it is
necessary to have action by a meeting of shareholders in extraordinary
assembly,2 by way of charter amendment.
The instances in which the decisions :of the shareholders can be chal-
lenged are stated generally in Art. 2377 of the Civil Code5 "Decisions
not taken in conformity with law or with the charter can be im-
pugned.. ))
Now, there is no doubt that majority shareholder action sufficient to
amend the charter can authorize, in the shareholders' discretion, a
capital increase; and if no technical violation of law is encountered, the
shareholders' decision is beyond attack.
The situation is somewhat different with respect to dividend dis-
tribution of earnings, normally arising and reflected in the accounts,
in as much as Civil Code, Art. 2433, providing that the shareholders'
* Roberto Locatelli, third year law student, University of Pavia, Milan, Italy, pre-
pared the portion of this article dealing with minority rights under Italian law.
' CODICE CIVILF, art. 2433 (Italy).
2 Anything requiring action by "extraordinary assembly" needs the favorable vote
of more than half of the "capital," unless the charter requires a greater proportion.
For action by "ordinary assembly" all that is needed is a majority of the duly constituted
meeting, which in turn requires a majority of the "capital" for a quorum, unless the
charter requires more. CODICE CIVILE, art. 2368 (Italy).
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assembly which approves the balance sheet (state of accounts) "de-
termines the distribution of earnings," has not been uniformly in-
terpreted. According to Ferrara, the assembly would have the further
power of distributing or not distributing the earnings, and a shareholder
has no individual right except with respect to earnings already ordered
distributed.3 Of contrary opinion is Fre, who maintains that the share-
holder has a subjective right to distribution of earnings which, if not
recognized by the assembly, gives right to an action of annulment be-
yond and outside of Art. 2433.4 Substantially agreeing with Fre is
Ascarelli. 5 Graziani6 speaks of a "customary norm" which imposes "a
periodical remuneration for the share capital in an amount to be de-
termined by standards of reasonable administration." By case law, the
Supreme Court in its decision of June 8, 1943, holds that the share-
holders' assembly has the discretionary power to distribute or not to
distribute the earnings, but this power must be restrained, in addition
to the limits imposed by the charter, by the corporation's needs for
conservation and for reserve funds for possible future crises.
It would seem that even the views of Graziani and of the case law
place only apparent limits on the power of the shareholders' assembly,
since they resort to evaluations (such as common interest and prudent
administration) entrusted (unobjectionably) to the judgment of the
majority. Therefore, although indirectly, even under this view the
power over a dividend distribution still falls within the full discretion
of the assembly.
On the other hand under Fre's thesis it would be possible to
"impugn" the Assembly Act by an annulment based on technical viola-
tion of law, without regard to any weighing of the merits. In the ab-
sence of this possibility, the assembly decision is beyond attack, just
as in the case of increase of capital.
But if an attack is not possible on the plane of technical legality,
that, is not to say that there is no other way to limit the powers of
majorities, who otherwise would be in position to perpetrate abuses.
Full discretionary powers are entrusted to majorities only to be
exercised in the common interest. If these powers are used for purposes
foreign to the common interest, the majority is abusing the powers en-
8 Imprenditori e Societa, Milano, 1955, page 376.
'Commentario del codice civile 1956; Societa per Azioni, sub. Art. 24.33.
' Sui poteri della Maggioranza nelle Societa per Azioni ed alcuni loro limiti, 48
RivIsTA del Drairro COMMERCIALE, p. 169, 183-x89 (1950).
6Diritto della Societa.
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trusted to it and is committing a substantially illegitimate act, and may
be challenged even outside of the text of Art. 2377 of the Civil Code.
The difficulty is to prove that the majority is acting for ulterior
purposes, since the majority is the very organ which decides where lies
the common interest.
Therefore, the shareholder who "impugns," for reasons of abuse of
power or deviation from authorized spheres of action, any decision of
the shareholders, such as for instance the increase of capital, is not
limited simply to proving the existence or non-existence of a corporate
opportunity to invest in expansion (which decision is solely within the
competence of the majority) 5 rather, he must prove the deviation of the
operation in question from the common interest-for example, the
desire of the majority to profit from the inadequate market possibilities
of the minority shareholders in order to raid the outstanding shares.
In such a case the shareholder's inquiry into the merits would not
be simply to discover absence of merit in the proposal but to ascertain the
unlawfulness of the underlying purpose and thus to get a judicial
declaration of the illegality of the action.
The theory of abuse of power or deviation in the exercise of power
is applied to resolve the grave conflict in legal theory between the
necessity of recognizing the assembly's power of discretional evaluation
of the exigencies of the corporate enterprise and the necessity of pre-
venting abuse of this power to the detriment of the minority.
This theory, set forth by Carnelutti in i926, 7 is fully borne-out by
text writers and case law. In the decision of the Court of Cassation,
May 21, 1951, one reads:
"The shareholders' Assembly certainly exercises its sovereign
prerogative when it proceeds to evaluate the corporate activities
and in the light thereof decides that the corporate capital is
inadequate to achieve the corporate objectives. If corporate capi-
tal is enormously increased against all criteria of wise administra-
tion and solely because some shareholders are unable to subscribe
for their shares, then from all these circumstances one could draw
sufficient indida for ascertaining whether in the shareholders'
decision there abides not so much an exercise of a normal right
but rather a fraudulent purpose to eliminate unwanted share-
" Eccesso de potere nelle deliberazioni dell assemblea delle anonime, z4 RIViSTA del
DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 176 (1926).
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holders and to concentrate solely in the majority group the newly
disposable shares."
In view of what has been said, one must submit that in the hypotheti-
cal case there is no lack of legal means for impugning the corporate
stand taken by the action of A and B to withhold dividends and in-
crease the capital.
With respect to the dividend distribution, if one were to follow
that segment of doctrine (i.e., views expounded by writers on the
subject) that holds that the assembly cannot refuse to distribute at least
in part, or to the extent indicated by arbitrium boni viri, the earnings
regularly available from operations as revealed by the financial state-
ment at the close of the fiscal period, it would seem clear that C should
no doubt be entitled to have the corporation declare a dividend of
$30,000, particularly since this sum does not appear to be needed in the
business.
If one were to hold, instead, that the shareholder assembly has full
and complete power over dividend matters, as well as capital increase,
the shareholder would be put to more extreme measures of proof of
abuse of power. In this event, it would not suffice for C to prove that
the $30,00 sum is not needed in the business and hence that its reten-
tion does not comport with sound administration or that there is no
sound business reason for such a considerable capital increase. Affirma-
tive conclusions in those directions would be only valid factual bases
from which it would then still be necessary to demonstrate that the
majority's purpose was really to avoid heavy income tax incidence and
to profit from C's inability pre-emptively to take of his shares so that
the others can pick up shares worth $5oo to $6oo for a price of $Ioo.
In view of the fact that, because of C's financial position, the con-
templated capital increase, if achieved by the proposed issuance of
shares at par, would affect C not merely by diminishing his proportional
participation in the corporate capital but also by diluting his holdings
by tens of thousands of dollars, and in view of the further fact that the
capital increase could be effectuated by other methods not prejudicial to
C, if the assembly does not adopt these other methods (e.g., issuance
of shares at discount or gratuitously so as to equalize the present
corporate capital with subsequent issues at par) it can plausibly be
maintained that its real motive is not to increase the investment in the
company.
[Vol. 1959: x16
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The same considerations apply to the distribution of the $30,000 on
hand.
C must convince the court that the earnings are being withheld be-
cause A and B's motives are to avoid heavy income taxes (there is no
corporate reason for withholding them) if C is to obtain annulment of
the shareholders? action.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States the declaration of dividends is considered a
matter of managerial business judgment falling within the discretionary
authority of the board of directors, who can act without ascertaining
the desires of the shareholders or, indeed, even against the express
desires of the stockholders.' Similarly, the issuance of additional shares
within the number authorized by the charter is generally within the
authority of the board of directors.2 However, the authority of the
board of directors does not extend to making fundamental changes
in the character or organization of the corporation, such as a charter
amendment increasing the total amount of stock which the corporation
is authorized to issue.3 Even so, under the facts of the hypothetical case,
the distinction is academic since, through their ownership of two-thirds
of the stock, A and B can control the board of directors and can carry
or defeat any issue submitted to the stockholders for approval By
exercising this dual control of directors' and stockholders' action, A and
B have the legal power to exercise the ultimate decision on dividend
declarations and new stock issuance.
Recognizing that the power residing in majority stockholders may
be subject to abuse, the American courts uniformly hold that there are
some situations in which an exercise of their equity power is justified to
curb technically legal actions of a corporation's majority which are
oppressive to the minority.5 . Courts interfere in corporate affairs with
'BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 42 (rev. ed. 1946).
'Ibid.
'Ibid.
"The one exception to this occurs in Virginia, where the charter can be amended only
by a vote of more than % of the shares. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-56 (1956 repl. vol.).
In several states, however, the charter may provide for a larger vote for amending the
charter than the statute requires. The following statutes have such provisions: ALA.
CODE tit. 10, § iS (Supp. 1953) i ARx. STAT. § 64-,o7 (1947); CAL. CoRP. CODE §
3632 (1955) i COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-3-3 (1953); FLA. STAT. § 6o8-18 (1956);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-146 (1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-223 (1948); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 271-445 (i95s); LA. REv. STAT. § 12:42 (1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
301.37 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5312 (1956); NEv. REV. STAT. tit. 7, § 78.390
(1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-00 (Supp. 1957) i TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-i2o
(x955); VT. STAT. § 5766 (1947); WASH. REv. CODE § 23.12.o6o (195!).
'BALLANTINE, §§ 66, z58, 205, 231 (rev. ed. 1946). See also Comments, 2
DUKE B.J. 113 (1952); 9 HASTINGS L.J. 306 (1958); 35 N.C.L. REV. 271 (1957);
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much reluctance, however, and a minority stockholder seeking the aid
of an equity court to challenge decisions concerning dividends or the sale
of additional shares of stock is required to sustain a difficult burden of
proof.6 This judicial reluctance, with its accompanying onerous burden
of proof, is probably grounded in the realization by the courts that they
are ill-equipped to make decisions on corporate policy in opposition to
the informed wishes of the directors and stockholders.
One general theory by which many courts approach the problem
of minority challenge of majority decisions holds that the majority
stockholders, when actually controlling the corporation,7 owe a fiduciary
duty to the minority stockholders.' While application of this fiduciary
concept by the courts is not uniform, the variations in its application
occur not so much because of definitional differences as in the intensity
of the applications of concepts such as good faith and fair dealing which
are the core of this rule.' When the courts state that the majority owes
the minority a fiduciary duty, it is not meant that the majority may
never act in its own interest when to do so would contravene the interests
of the minority group.10 The typical question confronting the courts
41 VA. L. REv. 77 (x955); Notes, 1o RUTcEvs L. REV. 723 (1956) S 7 WESTERN REs.
L. REV. 467 (956).
' Waldrop v. Martin, 237 Ala. 556, 188 So. 59 (1939); Allaun v. Consolidated
Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 Atl. 257 (1929) 5 Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refining
Corp., x4 Del. Ch. 193 , 126 AUt. 46 (1924) 5 Annot., 55 A.L.R. 8, 44 (1928).
"The courts do not require that the control group have over 5o% of the stock
before they will impose the fiduciary relation. The real criterion is whether the group
exercises effective control. Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221 Fed. 529
(6th Cir. 1915); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. I85, 123 N.E. 148
(91g); Note, 7 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 467, 468 (1956).
'Zohn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3rd Cir. 1947) 5 Lebold v. Inland
S.S. Co., 8z F.2d 351 (th Cir. 1936) ; Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 27 Fed.
6z 5 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) Consolidated Gold Mining and Milling Co. v. Gauthier,
22 Ariz. 67, 193 Pac. 1o2i (1920); Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340, 67
S.E.2d 350 (1951); Heller v. Baylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Patton v.
Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.2d 848 (x955). See Note 7 WESTERN RES. L. REV.
467 (1956), for a good review of the historical development of this concept.
'See Comment, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 306 (1958).
" For example, courts have upheld each of the following transactions: the issuance
of stock to majority stockholders to pay a debt owed to the stockholders by the corpora-
tion. Bellows v. Porter, 2o F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1953); the issuance of stock to a stock-
holder in payment for property sold to the corporation by the stockholder, Gamble v.
Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (189o) and the issuance of new
stock to obtain money to pay off mortgages held by the majority stockholders, Schramme
v. Cowin, 205 App. Div. 52o, 199 N.Y. Supp. 98 (st Dept. 1923). In each of
these situations, minority stockholders complained that they were unable to purchase
their pro-rata share of the new issue and thus their proportionate share of the corporate
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is one of degree, therefore, and the decision in each case will probably
turn on whether the court considers the majority's objectives and the
means used to attain those objectives fair and decent with respect to the
minority." Crucal in cases of this type are the motives of the majority,
which usually can be established only after a close analysis of such facts
as the business needs of the corporation, the nature of the particular acts
questioned by the minority, the type of business done by the corporation,
and the past and present relationship of the contesting parties.
Other courts phrase the rule differently, choosing to interfere only
when specific acts of the control group can be characterized as abusive
of discretion," unreasonable or arbitrary,' or in bad faith. 4  Despite
the terminology employed, each of these concepts is essentially equiva-
lent to the fiduciary duty rule, with accompanying emphasis on a
measuring of the fairness and decency of the majority's acts which affect
the minority.
A few decisions state that the complaining stockholder must prove
either detriment to the corporation itself or fraud before he can secure
relief.'5 These decisions, if taken at face value, would seem to impose
a more difficult burden of proof than the aforementioned tests. There
are several reasons, however, why this may be an inaccurate conclusion.
The facts of some of the cases in which these requirements were stated
were such that the courts would probably have reached an identical con-
clusion under any rule.' And although some jurisdictions have prec-
assets would be reduced, but their pleas were rejected because the transactions in
question were not unduly unfair.
" See Latty, Minority Shareholder Protection in American Corporation Law,
1957 JOURNAL OF BUsINESs LAW 229.
" Jones v. Motor Sales Co., 322 Pa. 492, 185 Atl. 809 (1936).
" Channon v. Channon Co., 218 II. App. 397 (1920).
"'Stevens v. United States Steel, 68 N.J. Eq. 373, 59 At. 905 (905) ; Tefit v.
Schaefer, 136 Wash. 302, 239 Pac. 837 (1925).
1rBellows v. Porter, 2o F.zd 429 (8th Cir. 1953), Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe,
Collector of Internal Revenue, 238 Fed. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); Gamble v. Queens
County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 95, 25 N.E. 2o (x89o); Mobile Towing & Wrecking
Co. v. Hartwell, 208 Ala. 420, 95 So. 192 (1922).
"
0In Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., supra note 15, the question was whether
the minority shareholder could enjoin the issuance of stocks and bonds worth $1o,ooo
to another shareholder in payment for a system of pipes which had been sold to the
corporation. The opinion of the court dealt extensively with the question of the
worth of the system of pipes to the corporation, concluding that $xo,ooo was not an
unreasonable price. Since the corporation got what it paid for, it does not appear that
the transaction was so unfair to the corpplaining stockholder as to constitute bad faith.
The share of the minority stockholder in the corporation was decreased in proportion
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edents which seem to require a showing of actual fraud, other decisions
from the same jurisdictions sometimes state that proof of bad faith is
sufficient, indicating that the two terms may have been used interchange-
ably.' 7 There is also ostensible authority for the proposition that fraud
is required which in fact did not arise in a case between minority and
majority groups in a corporation.' 8 These considerations lead to the
conclusion that, although courts occasionally speak in terms of detri-
ment to the corporation or fraud, these ostensibly more stringent stand-
ards usually do not impose upon minority interests a more difficult
burden of proof than that demanded under the unfairness approach
described previously.
Thus it appears that the courts exercise their equity powers on the
basis of a subjective value judgment as to the fairness of the majority's
treatment of the minority. This general proposition means little, how-
ever, when considered apart from the facts of the individual cases. A
more revealing analysis of the problem can be made in terms of specific
facts which have prompted courts to grant relief, and'in this respect,
a number of cases have dealt with problems closely analogous to C's.
One factor which has been considered important by the courts is the
business need of the corporation. Although this is ordinarily a question
of business judgment, and hence within the discretion of the directors,
courts have on occasion examined the amount of capital needed in the
business concerned to ascertain if there has been an abuse of discretion.
While courts have upheld continued dividend withholding where the
to that of the recipient of the stocks and bonds, but the total value of the corporation's
assets were also increased proportionately.
In Bellows v. Porter, supra note 15, the plaintiff complained of the issuance of
sioo,ooo worth of stock to a majority stockholder in exchange for the canceling of an
indebtedness of Sxoo,ooo which the corporation owed the majority stockholder. The
plaintiff made no showing that the debts owed by the corporation to the majority stock-
holder were not valid, and gave no proof that the corporation did not benefit by having
its current liabilities reduced. Further, there appears to have been no reason why
the majority stockholder should have been treated differently from other corporate
creditors. Under these circumstances, it seems the court could have concluded that the
whole transaction was not really unfair to the plaintiff.
"? In the decision of Mobile Towing & Wrecking Co. v. Hartwell, 2o8 Ala. 420,
95 So. 191 (i92z), there is language to the effect that fraud must be shown. As
authority for this proposition, the court cites, among other cases, Wolf v. Underwood,
96 Ala. 329, x So. 344 (1892), which states that bad faith is sufficient. The case of
Holcomb v. Forsyth, 2z6 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516 (1927), states that good faith is the
criterion.
" Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, Collector of Internal Revenue, 238 Fed. 847
(S.D.N.Y. 1917). There the corporation and the tax collector were the contesting
parties, and there was no mention of any conflict between the majority and minority.
[Vol. 1959: 116
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business was of a kind which required substantial working or expansion
capital,19 they have compelled dividends when it appeared that profits
had been withheld wholly out of proportion to the business needs. 20
Similarly, when confronted with the question of a new stock issue, courts
have been willing to examine the need for new financing. 21 As a practi-
cal matter, however, it is very difficult to prove the absence of a valid
business reason for withholding of dividends or issuance of new stock. In
today's complex business world, there are few situations indeed in which
a court can assert with confidence that plans of the directors for expansion
are completely unwarranted. It might be somewhat easier to prove
that a corporation has accumulated an unduly large surplus, 22 but here
again a moment's reflection will indicate the difficulty involved in con-
vincing a court that it should override the directors' judgment. These
difficulties of proof may explain the courts' reluctance to grant relief
19 In Gesell v. Tomahawk Land Co., 184 Ws. 537, 2oo N.W. 55o (1924), the
court examined the nature of the corporation's holdings and found them to be pri-
marily unimproved lands. The court then concluded that the defendant's policy of
expending capital to improve the lands in order to secure a larger price for the land
was not an abuse of discretion.
In Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 299, 6o Atl. 941 (1905),
the court took notice of the fact that all of the great industries of the United States
had expanded during the 2o years preceding the bringing of the case in question. The
court stated further that the profit per unit in the defendant's industry was decreasing
and that increased production was the only way to keep profits up. Evidence that the
company would have had to curtail its business because of an inability to meet all of
its orders in the absence of expansion was also mentioned. These factors, plus the fact
that the capital of the corporation in question had not yet been doubled as a result of
expansion, caused the court to conclude that the expansion in question was justified, and
that there had not been unreasonable dividend withholding.
20 In Crichton v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167, 36 So. 926 (x9o4), the corporation
began business with a capital of $26,ooo. Before the court was confronted with the
case, profits of $294,683.55 had already been made. The court decided that a dividend
of at least $50,000 should be paid since the corporation had made profits of more
than 1o times the amount of original capitalization.
In Hiscock v. Lacy, 9 Misc. 578, 30 N.Y.S. 86o (1894), one of the defendants
had admitted at trial that there was never a time when the bank was not able to pay
a dividend. Also important to the court was the fact that the corporation's surplus
was about $2ooooo, or the equivalent of Y of its capital, and more, proportionately,
than the corporation had possessed in the years when it was paying dividends annually.
2 Bellows v. Porter, 2ox F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1953) 5 Schramme v. Cowin, zo5 App.
Div. 520, 199 N.Y.S. 98 (ist Dept. 1923).2 1 Dodge v. Ford, 204 Mich. 459, 17o N.W. 668 (xix9), affords an example of
this. The court approved Ford's expansion plan, but there was even more surplus
available than was needed to carry out the plan. Therefore, a simple arithmetical
calculation was sufficient to show the court that there was enough surplus to pay a
dividend.
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based solely on their judgment that the acts in question were not justified
by business needs of the corporation.23 If C can prove, as he has alleged,
that there is in fact no real need for expansion and that cash on hand is
not needed for working capital, he will have satisfied one of the usual
prerequisites to relief.
Some courts have been influenced by the limited market for the
stock of a dose corporation in deciding whether to order a dividend.
24
Although a dear case is presented when it is shown that dividends
were withheld as part of an attempt to force a minority stockholder out
of a corporation, judicial intervention would seem to be appropriate in
cases presenting less aggravated circumstances, such as prolonged and
unreasonable withholding of dividends in a period when the corporation
is making high profits. In the absence of an adequate market, stock-
holders in a dose corporation can seldom realize the increased value of
their shares which has resulted from accumulated profits. Thus, the
dose corporation stockholder must rely almost exclusively on dividends
for a return on his investment. This factor is rarely mentioned by the
courts, but its frequent occurrence in cases where the minority succeeds
in having a dividend ordered by the courts indicates that it probably has
some influence on the courts. 5 The absence of a ready market would
thus appear to weigh in C's favor.
The type of evidence which will usually be considered most signifi-
cant by the courts is that of a conflict of interest between the majority
and minority groups, resulting in the majority's taking unfair advantage
of its power to indulge self-interests.2" For example, in one interesting
'.A reading of the cases cited in footnotes 19 through 22, supra, indicates clearly
that the courts did not rely solely on the business needs of the corporations in reaching
their decisions. In the case of Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 299,
6o AtI. 941 (i9o5), however, there is a suggestion that there might be certain
extreme situations in which a court should force a dividend solely because of un-
reasonable expansion at the expense of dividends.
" Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., supra note z3; Steven v. Hale-Haas
Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W.zd 6zo (1946).
2 Comment, z DUKE B.J. 113 (1952). See also Annot., 55 A.L.R. 8, 62 (1928),
which comments on the importance of this factor. One could argue, however, that
the reason this factor is present in most of the cases where dividends are ordered is
simply that most of the situations where court action is needed involve the small close
corporation.
"0 Courts have given relief when it was found that the directors were withholding
profits for the purpose of paying off corporate debts incurred in self-dealing contracts,
Crichton v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167, 36 So. 9z6 (1904); where there was an
attempt to force a minority shareholder completely out of the corporation, Flemming v.
Heffner & Flemming, 263 Mich. 561, 248 N.W. 9oo (933); and where majority
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case where a court held for the minority, a conflict of interest took the
form of a restraint of dividends to avoid the imposition of high bracket
income taxes on the majority.27 Since in the hypothetical problem C
has alleged that A and B are furthering their interests by avoiding
higher tax rates at the expense of his dividend expectations, that case
seems especially cogent. C's interests are adverse to those of the
corporate majority in another respect since A and B know that C cannot
obtain capital to purchase his pro-rata share of the new issue of stock.
If the shares are sold at par, a figure considerably less than their actual
value,28 A and B will simultaneously fatten themselves, dilute C's
interest in the corporate surplus, and decrease C's proportional interest
in the venture. Some courts have appreciated the plight of a share-
holder who is unable to purchase his pro-rata share of a new stock
issue and, when it appeared that the majority was taking an unconscion-
able advantage of his plight, have held for the complaining stock-
holder 29 Other courts have held that if the stockholder cannot exercise
his preemptive rights, his only recourse is to sell those rights."' While
the former rule has been articulated only in more recent cases, the
latter rule was first developed years ago. This contrast may mark the
beginning of a trend toward greater judicial solicitude for a stockholder
in C's plight.'
CONCLUSION
Although the facts alleged in this hypothetical problem do not
represent a great quantity of evidence, they may be of a sufficient quality
shareholders who held management positions were pursuing a policy of high salaries
at the expense of dividends, Hiscock v. Lacy, 9 Misc. 578, 30 N.Y.S. 86o (1894).
2Whittemore v. Continental Mills, 98 F. Supp. 387 (D.Me. 1951). Also im-
portant was the fact that continued expansion of the surplus might subject the corpora-
tion to a penalty under Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1o. See T. D. 4914, 1939-2 Cune.
Bull. io8.
"The par value of stock has no constant relation to its actual value. The
stock's book value or earning power, particularly the latter, are much more reliable
methods of approximating actual value.
2Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 736 (Del.Ch. 1953); Gaines v.
Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 34o, 67 S.E.2d 350 (1951).
so Bellows v. Porter, 2o F.zd 429 (8th Cir. 1953); Schramme v. Cowin, 2o5 App.
Div. 520, 199 N.Y. Supp. 98 (ist Dept. 1923).
2' Although there is language in the cases which indicates that there are two con-
flicting rules on this point, there are significant factual differences in the two groups
of cases. In the cases cited which espouse the old rule, there was no allegation that the
majority was trying to squeeze the minority out of the corporation, but there were
such allegations in the cases cited which followed the new rule. Although the courts
did not fully articulate the significance of this factor in their opinions, it may account
for the different rules.
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to prompt a court to grant relief, since C can perhaps create a suspicion
of "squeeze-out" or deliberate dilution sufficient to induce the court to
find bad faith, abuse of the fiduciary relation, or any other semantic
combination it may employ when it grants relief.32 In particular, the
thoroughgoing exploitation of C's position would seem to require ex-
planation by the majority. The plan of the majority to issue new stock
at par is even more indicative of an unfair use of power when it is
realized that an alternative plan-issuance of new stock at some figure
realistically closer to its actual value-is available by which capital can
be raised without so extensively diluting C's interest in the corporation.
An insufficient explanation of these particular circumstances would prob-
ably enable C to exact a remedy, even if A and B should present plausible
evidence on the issue of the corporation's business need.
A court resolving a case such as this in favor of the plaintiff would
probably follow the reasonable policy of gauging the severity of the
judgment by the amount and kind of proof offered by the plaintiff.
Using this criterion, it would take a hardy court to order A and B to
declare a dividend 3 and to require that any new shares be issued at true
value, since it is probable that the evidence on the issue of business
need will not be overwhelmingly weighted in C's favor. Thus the re-
lief in the hypothetical case would most likely take the form of an
injunction forbidding A and B to issue new shares at a price less than
some figure found by the court to be close to their actual value.
2 There is language in the following cases which indicates that proof of factors
such as those alleged by C would result in a decision for C: Steven v. Hale-Haas
Corp., 249 Wis. .09, 23 N.W.zd 620 (946); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp.,
99 A.2d 236 (Del.Ch. 1953) 5 Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340, 67 S.E.2d 390
('95')-
" On the matter of a dividend, C would face a somewhat easier task in North
Carolina as a result of a recent state statute. This statute allows at least 2o% of the
stockholders of a corporation automatically to force a declaration of dividends on at
least 3A of the profits of the current operations. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-5o(i) ('957
Supp.).
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